PEREZ v. WYETH LABORATORIES INC. & THE WISDOM OF AN ADVERTISING EXCEPTION TO THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE by Piranian, Heidi
 
PEREZ v. WYETH LABORATORIES INC. & THE WISDOM OF
AN ADVERTISING EXCEPTION TO THE LEARNED
INTERMEDIARY RULE
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation PEREZ v. WYETH LABORATORIES INC.
& THE WISDOM OF AN ADVERTISING EXCEPTION TO
THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE (2000 Third Year
Paper)
Accessed February 19, 2015 9:33:13 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10015322
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAAPEREZ v. WYETH LABORATORIES INC.
& THE WISDOM OF AN
ADVERTISING EXCEPTION TO
THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE
Heidi Piranian
Food and Drug Law
Harvard Law School
Professor Peter Barton Hutt
April 26, 2000
The Perez Decision
On August 9, 1999, the Supreme Court of New Jersey issued the rst
high-level court opinion to recognize a direct-to-consumer (\DTC") advertis-
ing exception to the learned intermediary rule.1Although the manufacturer in
Perez v. Wyeth Lab. Inc. had satised its duty to provide medical profession-
als with full warnings, the court held that the usual protection oered by the
learned intermediary rule was not automatically available since the manufac-
turer had engaged in DTC advertising. Because the manufacturer's advertising
campaign on television and in women's magazines had failed to warn of certain
1Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
1side eects and complications attendant to removal of its Norplant implants,
the court held that the question of whether inadequate warnings constituted
proximate cause should be submitted to a jury.
The 5-2 majority relied on a novel understanding of the learned intermediary
rule to justify its exception. It suggested that since the learned intermediary rule
was announced in a Norman Rockwell setting where physicians still made house
calls, the shift to managed care had rendered the rule less appropriate.2The
majority also employed great creativity in locating the so-called premises of the
learned intermediary doctrine in: (1) a reluctance to undermine the doctor-
patient relationship; (2) an absence in the era of \doctor knows best" of the
need for the patient's informed consent; (3) the inability of the drug manufac-
turer to communicate with patients; and (4) the complexity of the subject.3This
unique characterization of the rule enabled the majority to declare these four
premises invalid in the context of DTC advertising and therefore to nd the
learned intermediary rule inapplicable in this context.
The majority's holding was truly extraordinary in light of the plaintis' express
failure to allege that they had been inuenced by Norplant DTC advertising.
The court noted as much4but arrogated to itself the issue of whether DTC ad-
2See id. at 1255.
3See id. at 1255. For a discussion of traditionally stated rationales of the learned interme-
diary rule, see infra notes 32 to 39 and accompanying text.
4See id. at 1263-1264 (\We have no doubt that substantial proofs will be marshaled to
show that Norplant is a safe and ecacious product and that Wyeth's advertising, if any,
was fairly balanced. An agreed statement of facts submitted to the trial court suggested as
much.").
2vertising might have served as a proximate cause of the plaintis' injuries.5Based
on three chief assertions { (a) that DTC prescription drug advertisements may
cause pushy patients to press, wheedle, beg, and berate physicians for a pre-
scription, (b) that nancially strapped physicians cannot aord to lose patients
in the age of managed care, and (c) that physicians cannot compete with DTC
advertising budgets so they will eventually relent to pressure6{ the court con-
cluded that DTC advertising may be sucient to constitute a proximate cause
of harm. It further held that where a manufacturer has advertised directly
to the consumer, the prescribing physician may not break the chain of causa-
tion for a manufacturer's failure to warn the patient of side eects. Because
the majority was reluctant to excuse a physician entirely from liability for an
inappropriate prescribing decision, however, it held that a manufacturer held
liable might seek contribution.7 In an interesting twist on the opinion, the
court announced that a rebuttable presumption exists where a manufacturer
has satised its duty to warn end-users by complying with FDA advertising,
labeling, and warning requirements. It stated that \FDA regulations are perti-
nent in determining the nature and extent of any duty of care that should be
imposed on pharmaceutical manufacturers with respect to direct-to-consumer
advertising,"8appearing almost to create a private right of action for failure to
5See id. at 1260.
6See id. at 1261.
7See id. at 1263.
8See id at 1259.
3comply with FDA requirements.9However, it added that because FDA-approved
advertising is \fair and balanced...[for] all practical purposes, absent deliberate
concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful eects,
compliance with FDA standards should be virtually dispositive of such claims.
By denition, the advertising will have been `fairly balanced."'10With these
instructions, it remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether
Norplant's advertisements violated FDA requirements and whether such viola-
tions were a substantial factor in causing the harm suered by the plaintis.11
A dissenting judge oered a particularly withering assessment of the majority's
newly-recognized advertising exception. He observed that the majority was only
able to reach its holding by ignoring the plain statutory language that codied
the state legislature's endorsement of the learned intermediary doctrine.12Noting
the majority's willful mischaracterization of the duty to warn the physician as
one based on manufacturers' formerly circumscribed advertising activities, he
asserted that the rule's more universal premise is that physicians are the actors
best situated to make an individualized determination of the drug's risks.13He
was particularly critical of the majority's selection of Norplant as a the vehicle
for advancing an advertising exception, noting that the signicant involvement
9See Arvin Maskin, Konrad L. Cailteux and Lynda R. Vescio, Manufacturer-to-Patient
Advertising: Further Advice Following Perez, 18 No. 7 Prod. Liab. L. & Strategy 5 (2000).
10See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259.
11See id. at 1262.
12See id. at 1265.
13See id. at 1266.
4of a healthcare provider is assured in the case of Norplant because it requires
surgical implantation, cannot not be purchased anonymously in a supermarket
or over the internet, and is not promoted by HMOs.14 Unexplained asser-
tions pervade the rst opinion to recognize a DTC advertising exception to the
learned intermediary rule. For instance, the majority seized on the more ac-
tive role patients play under managed care to recharacterize the physician's role
as essentially ministerial in the drug prescribing process, without explaining
precisely how more actively involved patients invalidate the role of the physi-
cian as ultimate gate-keeper to the receipt of prescription drugs.15The majority
similarly disposed of a highly controverted issue in stating that the mere act
of advertising to consumers has eliminated a timeless diculty of conveying
detailed medical information in a meaningful way to laymen without further
elaboration of why this was so.16The majority provided no justication for col-
lapsing the distinctions between failure to inform and actively misleading to
\misrepresenting," so as to impose a fraudulent-misrepresentation analysis on a
failure-to-warn claim.17These notable inadequacies in reasoning as well as the
14See id. at 1268.
15See id. at 1256 (\The fact that manufacturers are advertising their drugs and devices
to consumers suggests that consumers are active participants in their health care decisions,
invalidating the concept that it is the doctor, not the patient, who decides whether a drug or
device should be used").
16See id. at 1256 (\Consumer-directed advertising rebuts the notion that prescription drugs
and devices and their potential adverse eects are too complex to be eectively communicated
to lay consumers").
17See id. at 1264 (\We are certain that legislative codication of the learned intermediary
doctrine - which generally relieves a pharmaceutical manufacturer of an independent duty
to warn the ultimate user of prescription drugs, as long as it has supplied the physician
with information about a drug's dangerous propensities - does not confer on pharmaceutical
manufacturers a license to mislead or deceive consumers when those manufacturers elect to
exercise their right to advertise their product directly to consumers."). See also Maskin et.
al., supra note 12.
5novelty of the majority's new-found exception give pause to reexamine the evo-
lution of the learned intermediary rule and the wisdom of establishing a DTC
advertising exception.
Evolution of the Learned Intermediary Rule
Pharmaceutical manufacturer liability has long been a unique area of
products liability law. Generally a manufacturer of an unreasonably dangerous
product is held strictly liable for a harm that results, but most jurisdictions
adhering to this standard have exempted prescription drug manufacturers from
it. The exemption is premised on the notion that although prescription drugs
are by their very nature incapable of being made safe for ordinary and intended
use, the public benets from the availability of these drugs.18Thus, in liability
suits concerning a prescription drug manufacturer's failure to provide adequate
warnings, liability is usually determined through a negligence-based reasonable-
ness inquiry,19with the inquiry focused on the adequacy of the warnings and
18See Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A cmt. k (1965) (which has been adopted
by a majority of jurisdictions and which exempts prescription drug manufacturers from strict
liability). Comment K, in relevant part, reads:
Unavoidable Unsafe Products. There are some products which in the present state of human
knowledge are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These
are especially common in the eld of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the
Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging con-
sequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both
the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justied, notwithstanding the unavoidable
high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied
by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The
seller of [prescription drugs, vaccines, and the like] products, again with the qualication that
they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation
calls for it, is not to be held in strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their
use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
19See Tim S. Hall, Bypassing the Learned Intermediary: Potential Liability for Failure to
Warn in Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 2 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
449, 457-458 (1993) (\Because the uncertainty of much drug design, and the fact that even
a designer may not know for certain how a drug works (and the inability of a designer to
substitute a less dangerous alternative), courts traditionally have not applied defective design
6the parties to whom warnings should be issued. Courts have long held that a
prescription drug manufacturer's common law duty to warn of a drug's dan-
gerous propensities is limited to members of the medical profession who stand
between the manufacturer and the end-user. This conception of the duty to
warn is known as the learned intermediary rule, which holds that full warnings
to the medical community excuse the manufacturer from a common law duty to
warn directly the end-users of its drug.20 The term \learned intermediary"
was rst coined by the Eighth Circuit in Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish,21 a case
concerning the manufacturer's failure to warn end-users of a rare side eect of
its arthritis drug. In its decision, the court announced that a prescription drug
manufacturer discharges its duty to warn the ultimate users of its drug by pro-
viding the medical profession with full warnings that elaborate on the known or
reasonably foreseeable risks associated with the prescription drug.22It reasoned
that the physician, upon receipt of full warnings associated with the drug, was
the most strategically situated actor to prevent injury to the consumer.23In
the years immediately following, virtually all jurisdictions to consider the issue
analysis to prescription drugs").
20See, e. g., Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977) (apply-
ing Maryland law); Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying Florida
law); Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying Washington law);
Salmon v. Park Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975) (applying North Carolina law);
McCue v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 453 F.2d 1033 (1st Cir. 1972) (applying New Hampshire
law); Terhune v. A.H. Robbins Co., 577 P.2d 975 (1978).
21370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).
22See id. (where the court noted that this was because it was dealing with a prescription
drug rather than a normal consumer item and because \the purchaser's doctor is a learned
intermediary between the purchaser and the manufacturer").
23See id. (\If the doctor is properly warned of the possibility of a side eect in some patients,
and is advised of the symptoms normally accompanying the side eect, there is an excellent
chance that injury to the patient can be avoided").
7found the learned intermediary rule applicable in failure-to-warn cases involv-
ing prescription drugs.24 Case law in its aftermath have dened the rule's
parameters. The learned intermediary rule has been extended to imply no duty
to warn end-users even where the manufacturer is aware that physicians are not
warning those end-users of known side eects of a prescription drug.25The duty
to warn extends, however, to all physicians who are involved with a patient in a
\decision-making capacity."26Adequacy is satised only if a manufacturer dis-
closes any warnings the manufacturer knows or should know are associated with
the drug27and noties the medical profession of any subsequent adverse eects
discovered to be associated with the drug.28 The learned intermediary rule
functions as an armative defense and is usually asserted as a summary judg-
ment motion in a failure-to-warn case. If the defendant manufacturer is able to
demonstrate that it supplied the medical profession with adequate information
about the drug's risks and benets, its duty to warn the patient of risks atten-
dant to the drug has been discharged.29In such cases, proximate cause may still
2457 A.L.R. 5th Section 2(a).
25See Buckner v. Allergan Pharm. Inc., 400 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 1981),
review denied, 407 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 1981) (\Since physicians do not have an absolute duty
to inform patients of all possible side eects in every instance, failure to do so in a particular
instance should not give rise to a duty in the manufacturer.").
26See McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974).
27See Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975), a'd, 567
F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977).
28See Lindway v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 85, 91 (2nd Cir. 1980).
29See, e.g. Thomas v. Homan-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 811 (5th
Cir. 1992); Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1115 (4th
Cir. 1988); Plummer v. Lederle Lab, 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1987);
Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Lab., 731 F.2d 1575, 1579 (11th Cir. 1984);
Wyeth Lab., Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So.2d 688, 691 (Miss. 1988); Niemiera v. Schneider,
555 A.2d 1112, 1117 (N.J. 1989); Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (N.Y. 1988).
8be attributed to the physician for failure to evaluate and communicate perti-
nent warnings supplied by the manufacturer. Traditionally the rule has shielded
manufacturers from liability in failure-to-warn suits, regardless of the source of
information received by the consumer before taking the drug.30This is largely
because plaintis encounter diculty getting the question of adequacy of the
physician's warning to the jury.31 The learned intermediary rule is premised
on several dierent but mostly congruent rationales. First, it is rooted in the
notion that the physician is best situated to understand the complex benet
and risk information because of his or her education.32Ancillary to this belief is
that it is dicult, if not impossible, for manufacturers to communicate complex
and technical risk information directly to the average reasonable person in a
comprehensible, meaningful manner;33hence, responsibility for conveying that
30See Joseph P. McMenamin, Samuel L. Tarry Jr. and Dennis J. Whelan, How Perez v.
Wyeth Laboratories Will Aect Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising, 18 No. 5 Prod. Liab.
L. & Strategy 7 (1999). But see Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers:
Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 141, 160 (1997) (noting that
the adequacy of warnings provided to physicians may be undermined by failing to include
known risk information, failing to draw sucient attention to warning information, diluting
the strength of warnings by overpromoting the product to the physician, or not communicating
the warnings through the most eective means available).
31See Noah, supra note 30, at 159-160 (\Although physicians may have an incentive to shift
blame to the drug manufacturer, normally they will testify that they understood the warnings
provided by the manufacturer, as contrasted with a plainti's testimony that the warning
communicated to the physician seemed insucient.").
32See Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) (containing the widely
quoted justication for the learned intermediary doctrine of \Prescription drugs are likely
to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in eect. As a medical expert,
the prescribing physician can take into account the propensities of the drug, as well as the
susceptibilities of his patient. His is the task of weighing the benets of any medication
against its potential dangers. The choice he makes is an informed one, an individualized
medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative. Pharmaceutical
companies then, who must warn ultimate purchasers of dangers inherent in patent drugs
sold over the counter, in selling prescription drugs are required to warn only the prescribing
physician, who acts as a learned intermediary between manufacturer and consumer.\).
33See Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that direct
warnings to end-users would be \almost inevitably involved and long winded" and \not...in
9warning is allocated to the learned intermediary, who stands between the man-
ufacturer and ultimate consumer as the most appropriately situated to disclose
warnings of a drug's particular side eects and contraindications.34Further, the
rule assumes that a manufacturer is unable to communicate an individualized
risk assessment to each end-user but that learned intermediary is situated to do
so. It is expected that the physician will make use of his or her understanding
of the drug's benets, side eects, and contraindications to perform an individ-
ualized benet-risk analysis that takes into account a patient's particular needs
and susceptibilities before deciding to prescribe a drug. Additionally, the rule
reects the belief that the physician's ability to communicate individualized
risk information is superior to that of the manufacturer, as he or she may sense
that a patient requires further explanation and may answer patient follow-up
questions.35 Other controverted rationales of the rule are that provision of
warnings directly to consumers will interfere with the physician-patient rela-
tionship,36may actually endanger the patient's health,37and are inappropriate
the patient's best interest"). See also Noah, supra note 30, at 159 (\because of the complexity
of risk information about prescription drugs, comprehension problems would complicate any
eort by manufacturers to translate physician labeling for lay patients").
34See Lars Noah, supra note 30, at 158 (\Drug manufacturers lack eective means to com-
municate directly with patients, making it necessary to rely on physicians to convey the
relevant information.").
35See Barbara Pope Flannagan, Products Liability: The Continued Viability of the Learned
Intermediary Rule as it Applies to Product Warnings for Prescription Drugs, 20 U.Rich. L.
Rev. 405, 413 (1986) (\The physician can articulate a warning to a patient, answering any
questions which the patient might have. In addition, the physician can recognize a patient who
might need more explanation. The physician is usually more accessible for follow-up questions.
In other words, no matter how well the drug manufacturer may predict the circumstances
under which the consumer may need to be warned regarding risks, the physician's warning is
superior.").
36See Noah, supra note 30, at 157 (cataloguing rationales of the learned intermediary rule).
37See generally McKee v. American Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1055 (Wash. 1989)
10because the physician should be the sole source of information about prescrip-
tion drugs.38These particular rationales are premised on the somewhat contro-
versial (and arguably discredited) paternalistic model of the physician-patient
relationship and they do not explain why the rule is an optimal allocation of the
responsibility to warn the end-user. They do not necessarily assume that the
physician is the only strategic actor able to make full use of manufacturer warn-
ings but only that the paternalistic model of a physician-patient relationship is
worth preserving and that the rule is helpful in maintaining that hierarchy by
preserving the physician as the sole source of risk information. These rationales,
however, are heavily relied upon by those seeking to invalidate the premises of
the learned intermediary rule.39 In limited instances where courts have found
the rationales of the learned intermediary rule particularly weak with respect
to a class of prescription drugs, they have recognized an exception to the rule
requiring the manufacturer to warn the end-user directly. These exceptions
recognized fall principally into three categories: mass vaccinations, drugs with
FDA-mandated consumer warnings, and contraceptives.
The only exception widely recognized by a majority of courts falls in the area
(\package inserts, written for the physician, are detailed and technical, and may confuse and
frighten the patient"). This justication appears to be a slight variation on non-interference
with the physician-patient relationship rationale, rooted in the assumption that warnings may
frighten a patient to the point of causing him or her to discontinue the drug-therapy without
informing the physician.
38See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the
Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 829, 842 (1991). It is doubtful whether
the physician has ever served as the sole source of information (see infra notes 130 to 138 and
surrounding text) and arguably serves more as an manufactured basis on which to topple the
learned intermediary rule rather than a truly descriptive basis of the rule.
39A prime example of this is the Perez majority's emphasis on the loss of the Norman
Rockwell physician in recognizing a DTC advertising exception.
11of mass immunizations.40Courts have located an exception where there is no
physician present to perform an individualized benet-risk assessment for each
patient administered the vaccine.41Thus, where physicians serve only in an ad-
ministrative oversight role and are not acting as learned intermediaries in advis-
ing patients individually, the manufacturer's duty to warn of side eects extends
to the actual recipients of the vaccine.42This exception for mass immunizations
has since been largely undercut by the National Childhood Injury Compensa-
tion Act,43which establishes a no-fault compensation scheme for those injured
by vaccinations. Fueled by a national vaccine crisis in the 1980s, the no-fault
compensation scheme insulates manufacturers from liability by eliminating any
tort claims based on a manufacturer's failure to provide direct warnings to in-
jured individuals.44Congress ultimately withdrew the issue of end-user warnings
from the province of the courts in this area, because open-ended tort liability
40See, e.g., Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964 F.2d 1348, 1361-64 (3d Cir. 1992); Petty v. U.S.,
740 F.2d 1428, 1440 (8th Cir. 1984).
41See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Labs, 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968) (determining that
the duty to warn end-users of a vaccine did not create an unreasonable burden because it
could be accomplished by provided stated warning on a release form); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs,
498 F.2d 1264, 1276-1277 (5th Cir. 1974) (nding that defendant manufacturer had duty
to warn individual recipients of vaccine when the product is \dispensed without the sort
of individualized medical balancing of the risks of the vaccinee that is contemplated by the
prescription drug exception"); Givens v. Lederle Labs, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977) (nding
an exception even where the vaccine was administered in a physician's oce).
42See, e.g., Davis, 399 F.2d at 131.
43National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. section 300aa-14(a)(Supp. II
1990) (establishing a no-fault recovery system).
44See Charles J. Walsh, Steven R. Rowland & Howard L. Dorfman, The Learned Interme-
diary Doctrine: The Correct Prescription for Drug Labeling, 48 Rutger L. Rev. 821, 861-862
(1996). See also Craig A. Marvinney, How Courts Interpret a Manufacturer's Communica-
tions to Consumers: The Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 47 Food & Drug L.J. 69, 72 (1992)
(arguing that this exception has led to some unanticipated consequences, including the fact
that \the exodus of manufacturers of these products over the last twenty years has rendered
the United States almost without manufacturers of vaccine drugs").
12failed to protect individuals and dramatically raised the cost of a product ben-
ecial to the public at large.45 A handful of courts have also suggested that
the learned intermediary rule may not automatically shield drug manufactur-
ers from liability where the FDA requires direct warnings to end-users.46The
only case to hold, however, that FDA-mandated direct warnings alone justies
an exception to the rule is Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals.47In this opinion,
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the rule did not shield a manu-
facturer from liability in a wrongful death action stemming from overuse of a
prescription nicotine patch. In the abbreviated patient warning accompanying
the product, the manufacturer had failed to advise of the possibility of fatal
or cardiac-related reactions to nicotine overdose, even though the manufacturer
had fully warned the prescribing physician of its side eects.48The court held
that the FDA regulations requiring nicotine patch manufacturers to provide
certain warnings to end-users rendered the learned intermediary defense un-
available in a failure-to-warn claim.49It further held that compliance with an
FDA mandate was evidence that a manufacturer acted reasonably and satised
a minimum standard but was not an absolute defense to a liability claim.50Other
45See Walsh et al., supra note 44, at 862.
46See, e.g. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985); Stephens v. G.D. Searle, 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich.
1985); Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985);
Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Wis. 1981), amended by 532
F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wisc.); Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
47933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997).
48See id. at 301.
49See id.
50See id. at 302.
13courts, when confronted with the opportunity to recognize an exception where
FDA has mandated warnings, have held that FDA regulations do not change
preexisting state common law duties of manufacturers.51 A few of courts have
also broached the possibility of an exception to the rule for prescription contra-
ceptives,52although the overwhelming number of courts have applied the learned
intermediary rule in such cases. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.53is
the only case holding unequivocally that there is an exception for contracep-
tives. In this case, the Supreme Judicial Court Massachusetts held that it was
not reasonable for a manufacturer to rely on a learned intermediary to convey
adequate warnings to the end-user54and it let stand the jury decision that the
manufacturer's failure to warn end-users directly of the risk of a stroke prox-
imately caused the plainti's injury.55The court justied its exception on the
belief that oral contraceptives \bear peculiar characteristics which warrant the
imposition of a common law duty on the manufacturer to warn users directly
of associated risks."56It supported this contention on three principal assertions:
51See, e.g., Martin v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. 1996);
Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398 (Del. 1989); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680
F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988); Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1033
(D.N.J. 1988); Goodson v. Searle Lab., 471 F. Supp. 546 (D. Conn. 1978).
52See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989);
Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867, 878 (E.D. Mich. 1985);
Stephens v. G.D. Searle, 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
53475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
54See id. at 70.
55See id. at 72.
56See id. at 69.
14(1) that healthy individuals' active participation in the decision to use prescrip-
tion oral contraceptives relegates physicians to a relatively passive role; (2) that
oral communications between physicians and consumers may be insucient or
too infrequent to fully apprise consumers of the product's dangers at the time
of initial selection and subsequent renewal; and (3) that FDA regulations re-
quire manufacturers to furnish consumers with written information regarding
benets and risks.57Such a blanket exception has not been adopted outside
the state of Massachusetts in the 15 years following the opinion's release, as
courts confronted with the issue have rejected the \passive physician" rationale
advanced by the MacDonald court.58 While the duty to warn end-users di-
rectly in the case of mass immunizations is easily rationalized on grounds that
the learned intermediary rule assumes and requires the direct involvement of a
learned intermediary, the rationales underlying the FDA-warning and contracep-
tive exceptions are far less compelling. In both cases, the learned intermediary
plays a vital and undiminished link in the end-user's receipt of the prescrip-
tion drug. A medical professional must make an individualized determination
as to whether the a prescription is appropriate as well as determine the proper
57See id.
58See, e.g. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999);
Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ill. 1996); West v. Searle & Co.,
806 S.W.2d 608, 614 (Ark. 1991); Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp.
1287, 1291 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Taurino v. Ellen, 579 A.2d 925 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990); Flumes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1039 (Kan. 1990); Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
708 F.Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398
(Del.1989); Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1032 (D. N.J. 1988);
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1305 (D. Minn. 1988); Staord v. Nipp,
502 So.2d 702, 704 (Ala. 1987); Rhoto v. Ribando, 504 So.2d 1119, 1123 (La. App. 1987);
Eiser v. Feldman, 507 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (N.Y. App. 1986).
15type and dosage of the prescription drugs in question before an individual can
legally obtain them. In the case of FDA-mandated warnings, comprehensive
labeling requirements are a tribute to the seriousness of potential side eects
and are not aimed to aect the standard of civil tort liability.59Similarly, in the
case of contraceptives, the elective versus nonelective distinction trumpeted is
not meaningful and wholly irrelevant in terms of the vital role played by the
learned intermediary. Further, the plus factor emphasized in connection with
the non-therapeutic distinction { the infrequent checkups associated with use of
the drug { does not undercut the rationale of the intermediary rule but rather
bespeaks the importance of the initial prescribing decision.60The irrelevance of
these distinctions is recognized by most courts, who have squarely rejected the
opportunity to recognize exceptions for drugs carrying FDA-mandated warnings
and prescription contraceptives.
Perez's Potential Reach in Light of Previously Recognized Exceptions
There are several reasons to expect that the Perez opinion may not ignite a
widespread advertising exception in light of this history of the learned interme-
diary rule. Most importantly, Perez is not a secure opinion in the sense that it is
the product of strong lineage. Opinions that lay the groundwork for recognizing
an advertising exception were scant. Only one court before Perez suggested in
a footnote that DTC promotion alone may inuence a manufacturer's duty to
warn end-users directly, and the opinion was reversed on other grounds on ap-
59See Walsh et al., supra note 44, at 867.
60See id.
16peal.61Additionally, only two other precursor opinions made a passing reference
to DTC advertising62in focusing on the peculiar class of prescription contra-
ceptives. The duty to warn end-users imposed by the courts in both instances
hinged on the non-therapeutic nature of the drug and DTC promotion as a
potential factor inuencing such a duty was relegated to dictum. Moreover,
these three cases were outlier opinions among the much larger group of opinions
squarely rejecting an exception for DTC advertising.63Favorable case precedent
for recognizing a DTC advertising exception clearly eluded the Perez majority,
as evident in its almost exclusive reliance on law review articles.
Perez's most immediate precursor decision also suggests a limited signicance
of the opinion. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig.,64a 5th Cir-
cuit opinion that predated the Perez decision by only several months and that
also dealt with Norplant, explicitly rejected an advertising exception. In arm-
ing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the manufacturer, the Fifth
61See Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 764 F.Supp. 208, 211 n.4 (D. Mass 1991), rev'd 976 F.2d
77 (1st Cir. 1992) (where the court suggested in dicta that in \an appropriate case, the
advertising of a prescription drug to the consuming public may constitute a third exception
to the learned intermediary rule").
62See Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1066 (8th Cir. 1989) (where the court determined
that comment K covered only critically needed prescription drugs and not the non-therapeutic
intrauterine device in question); Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich.
1985) (nding that a manufacturer is under a duty to warn patients directly of the side eects
of contraceptives when prescribed for contraceptive purposes).
63See, e.g. Thomas v. Homan-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.
1992); Hunt v. Homan-LaRoche, Inc., 785 F.Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1992);
Bealer v. Homan-LaRoche, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. La. 1990);
Harwell v. American Med. Sys. Inc., 803 F. Supp. 1287 (M.D. Tenn. 1992);
Hut v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (Ct. App. 1992); Ramey v. Collagen Corp.,
821 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
64165 F. 3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999).
17Circuit rejected the plaintis' claim that the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act superseded the learned intermediary rule and held that the learned inter-
mediary rule is a rule of law rather than a common law defense.65The court
rejected the plainti's invitation to recognize an advertising exception based on
the manufacturer's aggressive marketing practices, observing that there was no
evidence in the record supporting the claim that the plaintis relied on market-
ing materials.66It held, moreover, that even if there were evidence of reliance on
promotional material the only germane issue to determining applicability of the
learned intermediary rule would be whether the drug was dispensed by a physi-
cian.67The court also noted that FDA-recommended warnings did not defeat
the learned intermediary rule, holding that the rule applied in full force where
the severity of potential side eects caused the FDA to promote additional la-
beling.68 It remains unclear, however, what role the Restatement (Third)
of Torts will play in future litigation where plaintis urge a DTC advertising
exception. Section 6 of the most recent edition approved by the American Law
Institute provides a set of ground rules for imposing liability on pharmaceutical
manufacturers where the drug is allegedly defect due to inadequate warnings
or instructions. Preliminary drafts of the edition sought to recognize several
exceptions to the learned intermediary rule, including where FDA mandates
consumer warnings and where a manufacturer engages in DTC advertising, but
65See id. at 378.
66See id. at 379.
67See id.
68See id.
18these proposals were eventually dropped69and the nal draft took no position
on the issue.
Nonetheless, the nal version adopted contains two ambiguities that state courts
with an agenda may attempt to exploit in recognizing an advertising exception.
Subsection 6(d)(2) states that manufacturer liability attaches where the man-
ufacturer knows or has reason to know that no health care provider will be
in a position to reduce risks in accordance with its warnings and where the
manufacturer fails to communicate warnings directly to the patient.70This was
presumably aimed at mass immunizations where a physician-patient relation-
ship does not exist, but it may provide an opportunity for plainti lawyers to
argue that managed care relationships fall within its ambit. Comment e notes
that direct advertising of prescription drugs is a relatively recent development
and thus \leaves to developing case law" the issue of whether exceptions to the
learned intermediary rule ought to be recognized where (a) the manufacturer en-
gaged in DTC promotion or (b) FDA regulations mandated direct warnings for
end-users.71 It is unquestionable that plaintis will attempt to use this open-
ended language to persuade courts to recognize a DTC advertising exception to
the learned intermediary doctrine.72The Perez plaintis did precisely this, and
69See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 103(a)(3)(iii)(Council Draft
Do. 1, 1993). As noted in Noah, supra note 30, at 164-166, the accompanying notes to this
draft failed to cite any case law directly supporting an advertisement exception and cited only
one law professor's article urging such an exception.
70Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 6(d)(2)(1997).
71Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Cmt. 3 at p. 155. See also Jerey A.
Cohen and Janet A. Sullivan, Gray Areas Exist in Restatement (Third) on Drugs, Medical
Devices, 17 No. 3 Prod. Liab. L. & Strategy 1 (Sept 1998).
72See Bob Van Voris, \Drug Ad Could Spell Legal Trouble: Consumer Campaigns May
Result in Greater Liability," Nat'l L.J., July 21, 1997 at B1.
19the majority relied upon the Restatement (Third) of Torts' opening in creating
its DTC advertising exception. It remains to be seen whether other courts will
choose to construe the Restatement's commentary in a similar fashion in resolv-
ing failure-to-warn cases.73However, the Restatement's noncommittal approach
to an advertising exception leaves unanswered the questions of (1) whether an
exception is the appropriate response to the proliferation of DTC advertising
and (2) whether it would mark a positive direction for \developing case law."
The Rise of DTC Advertising
The exact proportions of DTC prescription drug advertising, as described
by the Perez majority, bear mention in examining what impact, if any, it ought
to play in altering existing tort liability of manufacturers.
Promotion of prescription drugs directly to consumers is a relatively recent de-
velopment of the past two decades. Previously, manufacturers restricted promo-
tional eorts to physicians, concentrating their eorts on print advertisements
in medical journals and direct pitches to physicians. In 1983, however, the rst
television ad for a prescription drug appeared. FDA responded immediately
with a regulatory letter74and shortly thereafter with a \Statement of Policy"
requesting the suspension of such advertisements so that the agency might study
the issue. After an ample period of time in which to consider DTC advertising
73See Noah, supra note 30, at 144 (commenting that \the Reporters ultimately succeeded at
including language that may lead courts to expand greatly the duty of drug manufacturers to
warn consumers of prescription drug risks, especially when combined with the FDA's proposed
new regulations").
74See \Rx Advertising to Consumers," FDA Talk Paper No. T83-23, May 23, 1983.
20of prescription drugs, FDA lifted its moratorium and permitted pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers to continue DTC prescription drug advertising under the
regulatory safeguards then in place in 1985.75
Prescription drug advertisements have since become commonplace in news-
papers, magazines, and television advertisements. Over the years manufacturers
have branched out from \informative" advertisements, which lack the name of
the manufacturer's drug prescribed to treat the featured condition, to advertise-
ments that are product specic.76The Rogaine promotional campaign marked
the rst of the ever-popular product specic advertisements77and product spe-
cic advertisements occupy a prominent position in manufacturers' promotional
campaigns today.
DTC advertising of prescription drugs has soared in the past two decades and
the upward trajectory shows no signs of leveling. DTC prescription drug ad-
vertising is currently the sixth largest category of consumer advertising in the
U.S., with an estimated value at 1.8 billion.78In the rst half of 1999 alone, DTC
expenditures for prescription drugs reached $905 million, a 43 percent increase
over spending for the same period the previous year.79Use of DTC advertising
75See Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 465 (2nd ed. 1991).
76See Hall, supra note 19, at 452.
77But see id. at n.9 (commenting that the line separating purely informative from product-
specic was somewhat hazy as \some ads that appeared prior to the Rogaine campaign were
criticized for crossing the line between information and product-specic selling").
78See "Just a Spoonful of Sugar," Australasian Business Intelligence: Marketing Magazine,
March 1, 2000.
79See Matthew R. Miller, \US Spends $905 Million on DTC Prescription Drug Advertising,"
Response TV, November 1, 1999, p. 19 (citing London-based IMS Health).
21as a promotional tool also appears to be widely embraced by prescription drug
manufacturers: in the rst 10 months of 1999, manufacturers launched 22 new
DTC campaigns to advertise brand-name drugs and 10 campaigns to highlight
diseases.80These numbers are accompanied by a rise in consumers reporting
exposure to a prescription drug advertisement.81As of 1999, television adver-
tisement appeared to be the favored DTC advertising medium of choice. For
the rst half of the year, manufacturers spent $529 million on television, $370
million on print advertising, and $4.7 million on radio and outdoor advertising.82
The steady surge in DTC prescription drug advertising expenditures has been
propelled by the lure of greater prots. Studies measuring the eectiveness of
such advertising are limited, although they indicate that DTC has been a suc-
cess from the manufacturer's point of view in terms of raising awareness of a
particular drug. A study tracking DTC since 1988 concludes that DTC adver-
tising campaigns are a powerful tool in terms of raising consumer awareness of
available treatment options, encouraging patients to schedule physician visits,
and encouraging patients to request specic medications by name.83Results of
the study also suggest that DTC advertisements have played a substantial role
in facilitating dialogue between patients and physicians.84Raw numbers from
80See "Scott-Levin Releases Year in Review 1999," Business Wire, March 24, 2000.
81See "DTC-Generated Rx Script Volume Remains Flat," The Pink Sheet, October 4, 1999
(\As of April 1999, 81% of adult consumers had seen or heard an ad for an Rx medication,
an 11% jump from the 70% reported in 1998, and a signicant rise from the 63% reported in
1997.").
82See Miller, supra note 79.
83See Tom Marcinko, Medical Marketing & Media (November 1, 1998).
84See id. (\three-quarters of the physicians surveyed in 1996 (the most recent year for which
22the past year also support this proposition: of the 176.7 million consumers who
had viewed DTC advertisements for prescription drugs, 54.8 million discussed
advertised drugs with their physicians, and 15.3 million requested a prescrip-
tion based on an advertisement, 12.9 million of which received that prescrip-
tion.85Three-fths of medical conditions accounting for increased physician vis-
its were conditions featured in DTC ad campaigns.86Further, drug sales surged
in pharmaceutical categories most heavily advertised to consumers over the past
year.87 The relationship between aggressive DTC advertising and sales may
not be as linear as critics suggest, however, for several reasons. Although the
rate of patients that visit physicians is strong among consumers who are aware
of DTC advertising,88the rate of recall is much lower among mature consumers
who are the target audience most likely to use prescription drugs.89Further,
most consumers viewing DTC advertisements remain unaware of the specic
health condition that an advertised drug is targeted to treat after exposure to
promotional activities.90Additionally, patient requests for a specic drug based
these data are available), said that patients had talked about the contents of DTC ads they
had heard or seen").
85See "Awareness of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Ads Stalls," Research Alert,
Vol 17 Issue 19, October 1, 1999 (citing a Prevention Magazne survey).
86See Marcinko, supra note 83.
87See Jill Wechsler, \The DTC Dilemma," Pharmaceutical Executive, November 1, 1999
(citing the PE Washington Report of September 1999 stating that oral antihistamines, an-
tidepressants, cholestorol-reducers, and antiulcerants led the drug sales surge).
88See Christine Truelove, \Creativity is Creeping in DTC," Med Ad News, November 1,
1999, p. 1 (citing a study conducted by Market Measures Inc.).
89See supra note 85.
90See id.
23on DTC advertising do not automatically result in a prescription for that drug
and often times results in a prescription for a competitor product.91Proles of
the relationship between DTC advertising expenditures and sales for individual
prescription drugs also refute the notion that there is a direct correlation. For
instance, Pzer's aggressive DTC promotion of Viagra has yielded disappoint-
ing results for its manufacturer, as its DTC campaign has proved insucient to
sustain the sales even after taking into account the expected slowdown in sales
post initial excitement.92Thus, while manufacturers engaging in DTC adver-
tising have enjoyed gains, the correlation between promotion and prescriptions
appears to be more complicated than the direct correlation touted by advertis-
ing critics.
The FDA's Response to DTC Advertising
The FDA's current regulation of DTC advertising is another critical com-
ponent in assessing the necessity and desirability of altering manufacturer lia-
bility through recognition of an advertising exception.
FDA currently regulates advertisements pursuant to its prescription drug au-
thority under 21 U.S.C.A. 352(n) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The
FDA retains the authority to monitor DTC advertising materials and may sanc-
91See "One-Third of Consumers Ignore DTC Print Ad Brief Summary," The Green Sheet,
January 31, 2000. In analyzing the results of the FDA's survey \Attitudes and Behaviors
Associated With Direct-to-Consumer Promotion of Prescription Drugs," it notes that \many
Rx requests instigated by a DTC campaign are being fullled by competitor products, the
survey found. Of the 220 consumers who had asked about a prescription in the three months
prior to the survey, 50% received a prescription in the three months prior to the survey, 50%
received a prescription for that product, 32% received a dierent Rx, 14% were recommended
an OTC treatment and 29% were given lifestyle change recommendations."
92See "Weak Sales of Viagra Hurt Pzer's Results," Medical Industry Today, October 15,
1998.
24tion errant manufacturers by the usual methods of (a) sending an untitled letter
stating the FDA's objections to the promotional material, (b) issuing a warning
letter asking the manufacturer to discontinue the advertisement or take remedial
measures, (c) seizing or enjoining the use of materials making similar claims,
or (d) criminally prosecuting the manufacturer and individuals involved.93FDA
has also requested authority to enforce civil monetary penalties \in an amount
sucient to oset any potential gains from the violative conduct," which if
granted by Congress, will further strengthen the agency's ability to enforce its
DTC guidance.94 Enforcement of the FDA's guidelines in the realm of pre-
scription drug DTC advertising is not ocially accomplished at the preclearance
of advertisements stage,95although the FDA encourages \voluntary" preclear-
ance of such advertisements. In practice, however, preclearance is the de facto
course of action for manufacturers because they cannot aord to ignore the
request in light of their ongoing relationship with the FDA. Further, preclear-
ance enables these manufacturers to avoid formal reprimand by the FDA and
the bad publicity that ensues.96FDA's surveillance eorts in the realm of DTC
advertising are also bolstered by consumer groups and by competitor drug com-
panies who are spurred by heightened competition to point out inadequacies of
93Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,314, 24, 315 (1997).
94See 56 F-D-C Rep., \The Pink Sheet," Oct. 17, 1994 at 6.
9521 C.F.R. Section 202.1(e)(1) (although manufacturers must seek preclearance if the drug
in question may cause fatalities or serious injury).
96See Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, Am. J.L. &
Med. 149, n. 133 (1999) (\If, however, a pharmaceutical company submits a new promotion
through the DDMAC's optional preclearance process, objections to an advertisement will be
conveyed privately, thus sparing the company from bad publicity.").
25their opponents' broadcasts.97 DTC advertisements of prescription drugs are
subject to the brief summary requirement,98which requires advertisements to in-
clude a \brief summary relating to side eects, contraindications, and eective-
ness."99An advertisement lacking a brief summary and fair balance is deemed by
the FDA to be misleading or false and ultimately misbranded.100Although the
brief summary requirement typically requires inclusion of all package insert in-
formation, the FDA has recognized that the length of broadcast advertisements
render the disclosure of full labeling impossible and that insistence on the reg-
ular brief summary would eliminate the use of broadcast advertising. Thus, it
has formulated special rules to accommodate radio, television, and telephone
DTC advertising. These special rules obligate a sponsor to make a \major
statement" of major risks and side eects in the broadcast advertisement but
permit the sponsor to make \adequate provision" for the package labeling in
connection with the presentation if the brief summary is not part of the broad-
cast.101 Prior to 1997, the requirements for satisfying adequate provision in
97See Greg Borzo, \New FDA Rules for Advertising Drugs on TV Raises Questions," Am.
Med. News, Sept. 8, 1997, at 3. See also Terzian, supra note 96, at 164.
98Note, however, that reminder ads (which feature the medication and manufactuer's names
but no claims about the drug's eectiveness) and help-seeking ads (which urge consumers
to consult with a physician about certain conditions) are exempt from the brief summary
requirement because they avoid substantive remarks about a particular prescription drug.
9921 C.F.R. Section 202.1(e).
10021 C.F.R. Section 202.1(e)(5)(1997). The FDA construes this liberally to \include ad-
vertisements in published journals, magazines, other periodicals, and newspapers, and adver-
tisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, and telephone communication
systems."
10121 U.S.C. Sec. 202.1(e)(1). See also Karl E. Seib, Jr. and Andrew E. Miller, Courts
Should Rebu Assault on `Learned Intermediary' Rule, 1 No. 7 Andrews Diet Drugs Litig.
Rep. 18.
26DTC prescription drug advertising were somewhat indeterminate. In an eort
to enable manufacturers to fulll DTC advertising requirements, the FDA re-
leased a Draft Guidance in August of that year establishing a four-part test for
adequate provision in broadcast advertisement.102It instructed sponsors to: (1)
feature a toll-free phone number at which consumer may request package insert
information; (2) inform viewers that additional product information is available
in print advertisements or brochures; (3) state that pharmacists or physicians
may provide additional product information; and (4) feature a web address in
the advertisement or toll-free phone recording.103 The response by industry
to the Draft Guidance has been overwhelmingly positive, as the guidance has
been credited with spawning the biggest spending increase in the history of
pharmaceutical advertising. Because the guidelines considerably eased the bur-
den on manufacturers engaging in broadcast promotion by clarifying regulatory
requirements, the guidelines cleared the way for a majority of pharmaceutical
manufacturers to diversify their promotional eorts from mostly print advertise-
ments to radio and television advertisements.104The guidance also appears to
have inuenced manufacturers' selection of the media type for such campaigns,
10262 Fed. Reg. 14,912, 14,913-16 (1997). Note that the Draft Guidance is not legally
binding and does not establish legally enforceable rights or responsibilities. However, FDA's
practice has been to issue technically non-binding policy statements and guidance so as to
avoid cumbersome formal rulemaking procedures which grant interested parties a right to
demand a hearing. See Noah, supra note 30, at 146 (\after originally promulgating its adver-
tising regulations in the 1960s, the Agency has preferred to issue technically nonbinding policy
statements and guidelines...or to pursue individualized enforcement actions in this area.").
103See "Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements," The Pink Sheet, Vol. 59, No. 32,
p. 4 (August 11, 1997).
104See Joseph P. McMenamin, Samuel L. Tarry Jr. and Dennis J. Whelan, Pulling the Net
From Beneath Consumer-Directed Advertising, 18 No. 4 Prod. Liab. L. & Strategy 1 (Oct.
1999).
27as DTC advertising on television has climbed dramatically.105 The FDA has
proved adept at monitoring compliance with the guidance and detecting at-
tempts to out its basic requirements. In the year following the announcement
of the 1997 guidelines, the FDA detected violations in recalling more than 10 ads
that it believed to overstate benets and concomitantly understate risks.106In
particular, the FDA demonstrated competence in singling out manufacturers
who attempted to gloss over side eects though background music, distracting
visuals, and increasing the rate of voice-over copy107and in swiftly securing re-
dress of violations.108Further, in reviewing the guidelines two years after their
initial release, FDA demonstrated a responsiveness to DTC advertising con-
cerns that developed and a willingness to tailor changes to these concerns by
incorporating six changes to the guidance.109 The guidelines have operated
105See Marcinko, supra note 83 (reporting that the use of television in DTC promotion rose
from 21% in 1996 to 47% in the rst quarter of 1998, whereas magazine use fell from 71% to
47% in the same time period).
106See "Direct to Consumer Ads: FDA Rules Create Ad Bonanza," American Health Line,
August 10, 1998.
107See Laurie Freeman, \Accepting the Risks: Throng of Possible Side Eects Go Hand in
Hand With Creative to Meet FDA Guidelines," Advertising Age, April 3, 2000 (citing Roche
as reprimanded by the FDA \when ads for fat-blocker Xenical...used distracting music to
drown its list of gastrointestinal and other side eects").
108See Terzian, supra note 96, at 153 (chronicling the FDA's reprimand of Schering-Plough
for reading side eects so quickly in two of its Claritin advertisements that is was dicult for
consumers to understand, where television networks pulled the ads immediately and Schering-
Plough quickly revised the ads to comply with guidelines).
109See CDER \Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements Guidance" Commentary, Au-
gust 1999. The changes include: (1) reformatting the assumptions underlying what constitutes
a compliant broadcast advertisement in general; (2) deleting the option under the toll-free
telephone component of the adequate provision approach to oer to fax product labeling to
consumers; (3) emphasizing the need for the print advertisment component of the adequate
provision approach to be broadly disseminated; (4) acknowledging that the print brochures
alternative component of the adequate provision approach was likely to be feasible only when
broadcasting was fairly limited in scope; (5) acknowledging explicitly that health care pro-
fessionals other than physicians and pharmacists can be sources of additional human drug
product information; and (6) adding a discussion to clarify the dierences in satisfactory ad-
equate provision approaches for telephone advertisements, compared with television or radio
28as a exible tool, capable of responding to developments in DTC advertising
and abuses. The FDA remains committed to surveiling developments in DTC
advertising, studying such developments, and counteracting problems by insti-
tuting changes in its guidelines where necessary. In nalizing its draft guidance,
the FDA communicated its growing impatience to advertisers who satisfy the
adequate provision requirement for broadcast ads by disseminating the drug's
brief summary in an obscure manner and announced its intention to monitor
the availability of print advertisements.110The FDA also signaled that it may
reconsider adequate provision disclosure guidance that permits broadcast ads to
feature such disclosures while reading risk information simultaneously, in order
to combat low consumer recall of disclosures identifying print and web pages as
sources of additional information.111Additionally, it has commissioned a survey
to analyze the eects of prescription drug advertising on consumers.112Lastly,
the FDA is examining the eect of increased DTC advertising on public health
over the next two years and is prepared to ne-tune its guidance further if nec-
essary.113The agency has not taken its responsibility to protect consumers in
the realm of DTC advertising lightly and there is no reason to expect that it
advertisements.
110See id. (\FDA generally believes that a sponsor has not provided adequate access to the
product's package labeling when the print component of their adequate provision approach
is highly targeted or made only narrowly available and the product is broadly advertised in
broadcast media.").
111See James G. Dickinson, "Most Recent DTC Developments Favor Print Over Broadcast
Media," Medical Marketing & Media, September 1999.
11263 Fed. Register 49,582 (1998).
113See Wechsler, supra note 87.
29will shirk its responsibility to do so in the future.
Although FDA is currently entrusted with the task of regulating prescription
drug advertising, a shift in responsibility to the FTC remains a possibility. Some
have argued that as advertisements become more sophisticated, the FTC may
be better suited than the FDA to regulate such advertising.114They note that
the transition in authority would be relatively smooth, as the FTC currently has
jurisdiction over OTC drug advertisements. There is ample support for contin-
ued FDA authority in this area, however. As regulatory authority is currently
structured, FDA is able to leverage its power in product approvals to exert great
inuence on wayward manufacturers who have engaged in advertising violations
particularly when the manufacturers have product approvals pending before the
FDA. Swift corrective action is likely to follow an FDA reprimand under such cir-
cumstances, because if a company's nancial backers suspect that resistance to
an FDA enforcement policy might delay a pending drug approval, the company's
market value and nancial stability may be jeopardized.115Further, the FDA's
emphasis on a more vigilant and hands-on regulatory style may be better suited
to grapple immediately with advertising abuses in contrast to FTC's reliance
on self-regulation and private resolution of disputes.116 Based on the FDA's
demonstrated vigilance in the area of DTC prescription drug advertising abuses
and current incentives for manufacturers to comply with FDA-recommended
114See Terzian, supra note 96, at 154.
115John F. Kamp, CDER Direct-to-Consumer Promotion Hearing, October 18, 1995.
116See Terzian, supra note 96, at 155.
30alterations, the FDA appears competent to monitor DTC advertising. Because
there is little reason to believe that the FDA will become complacent and fail
to ne-tune guidelines in response to future problems that are identied, the
assertion that a DTC advertising exception is a necessary blunt instrument to
counteract advertising abuses is unsupported.
Criticisms Leveled at DTC Advertising/Reasons Advanced for Creating an Advertising Exception
There are those that argue that an advertising exception is necessary to
supplement to current FDA regulations, however. At a general level, they high-
light that the chief goal of DTC prescription drug advertising is to promote the
use and sale of a product rather than to educate the consumer.117They assert
that DTC marketing is geared towards forming \consumer preferences" and in-
creasing demand for inappropriate medication which will ultimately result in an
increase of end-user injuries118and therefore weaken the underpinnings of the
learned intermediary doctrine.119They argue that increased sales of prescription
drugs in the age of DTC advertising reect not only past underutilization of a
117See Hall, supra note 19, at 462 (arguing that only FDA regulation and enhanced manu-
facturer liability through an advertising exception together \will prevent blatant puery and
insupportable claims of ecacy without destroying the character of the advertising").
118See Barbara J. Tyler and Robert A. Cooper, Blinded by the Hype: The Burden When
Manufacturers Engage in Direct to Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 21 Vt. L.
Rev. 1073, 1098 (1997) (citing Prescription Drug Advertising Direct to the Consumer, 88
Pediatrics 174, 175 (1991) for this proposition). The causal connection between \consumer
preferences" and increased end-user injuries implied here seems to hint at the harm of self-
medication. Self-diagnosis and medication by prescription drugs is rendered an impossibility
under the prescription/OTC classication regime because a health care professional's approval
is a necessary prerequisite, but this distinction is glossed over by those asserting that consumer
injuries are a direct result of DTC advertising.
119See Hall, supra note 19, at 461 (where the author asserts a classic argument of this type in
stating that DTC \clearly inuences the balance of power in the physician-patient relationship.
A physician confronted with a patient who is informed about the treatment alternatives will
probably give substantial weight to that patient's desires when making treatment decisions.").
31drug therapy but inappropriate use of medications that have resulted in mon-
etary and human costs. Based on these assumed adverse eects,120they argue
that an advertising exception is necessary.
The rationales on which they mount this claim fall primarily into 4 categories.
The Hobbled Intermediary Rationale
Advertising exception proponents' strongest theory on which to base the ex-
ception is a hobbled intermediary. Advocates of an advertising exception al-
lege that a manufacturer's DTC promotion eorts should not be shielded by
the learned intermediary doctrine because the eect of such promotion is to
bypass the learned intermediary altogether.121They argue that DTC advertis-
ing undermines a physician's ability to function as a medical care provider,
therefore causing the physician to grant inappropriate requests for prescrip-
tion drugs.122They note that the prospect of inappropriate prescriptions is
heightened in an age where patients may \doctor shop" or receive prescriptions
from physicians on the internet by answering a series of questions and forgo-
ing a physical examination.123 Because manufacturers advertise prescription
120There are those that impute far less savory motivation to DTC advertising exception
proponents, however. See, e.g. Noah, supra note 30, at 170 (\Ultimately, although they
elaborate on the supposed weakness for rationales for the learned intermediary rule in cases
where manufacturers advertise directly to consumers, proponents of an advertising exception
seem to rest their position on what they perceive as crass, prot-motivated advertising of
prescription drugs. Once pharmaceutical manufacturers stoop to direct consumer advertising,
the argument goes, they no longer deserve the special treatment that they have enjoyed under
tort law.").
121See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 38, at 848 (\Once they engage in such advertising, they
become like any other product seller and the same product liability rules should apply. There
is no justication for protective rules that shield drug manufacturers from direct responsibility
to the consumer.").
122See Seib, Jr. et al, supra note 101.
123Note that these specic injuries are the direct result of questionable physician practices
rather the learned intermediary rule as it currently functions in an age of DTC prescription
32drugs directly to consumers, these advertising exception proponents argue that
these manufacturers assume the obligation to warn consumers directly and dis-
prove the idea that it is too dicult to provide meaningful consumer warn-
ings.124Further, they claim that an exception is necessary to force manufac-
turers to internalize the costs incidental to an advertising campaign,125which
they allege are quite high in lieu of manufacturers' manipulation of consumer
risk assessment.126They anticipate that the creation of an exception will reverse
drug manufacturers' unwillingness to include user-friendly warnings that might
refute the claims of the promotional material and will ensure that the public re-
ceives risk information necessary to properly weigh manufacturers' promotional
claims.127Informed Consent Rationale
Proponents of an advertising exception sometimes argue from an informed con-
sent perspective as well. Under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician
drug advertising. Additionally, these injuries do not occur at the behest of manufacturers,
because manufacturers oppose on-line sales to rst time users and are actively ghting them.
Bad medical practices are better addressed by state medical boards and by amending federal
law, which currently only requires that doctors either have a relationship with the patient or a
consultation \during the usual course of his professional practice." For a lengthier discussion
of this problem, which is beyond the scope of this paper, see Louis Lavelle, \Growth of On-
line Pharmacies Raises Concern/Doctors, State Consider Them Bad Medicine," The Record,
December 6, 1998 p. A1.
124See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 41, at 842-843 (\The proposition that prescription products
are too complex, and individual reactions too varied, to permit eective consumer warnings
may also be dicult for manufacturers to argue, because their current advertisements do carry
warnings.").
125See Tyler and Cooper, supra note 121, at 1096.
126See id. at 1095 (\The marketing gimmick used by the drug manufacturer often provides
the consumer with a diluted variation of the risks associated with the drug product.").
127See id., at 1096. See also Susan A. Casey, Laying an Old Doctrine to Rest: Challenging
the Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 931, 956
(1993) (\consumer-directed advertising rebuts the notion that prescription drugs and devices
and their potential adverse eects are too complex to be eectively communicated to lay
consumers").
33may be held liable for failing to communicate pertinent risks and therefore failing
to obtain the patient's informed consent before pursuing a course of treatment.
Advertising exception proponents argue that the standard for informed consent
- one traditionally informed by local practice of the medical community - does
not adequately convey information to patients in practice and is inconsistent
with a patient's right to self-determination.128The argument appears to be that
both the physician and manufacturer are capable of disclosing this information,
and that manufacturers should be required to do so in case physicians fail to do
so. A DTC advertising exception in this context functions as a convenient peg
upon which to hang a critiques of the current informed consent standards and
thus is designed to ensure that a patient will receive full disclosure by circum-
venting the discretion of the physician.
What remains unclear under this theory is why a physician's failure to satisfy
his legal obligation to supply warning information implicates DTC advertising
sponsored by prescription drug manufacturers as opposed to standards by which
informed consent is measured. Informed consent attacks ultimately do not chal-
lenge the basic premises underlying the intermediary rule129and fail to present
a cogent argument why responsibility for a physician's failure to comply with
128See Schwartz, supra note 38, at 831. See also Casey, supra note 27, at 958. It is not
clear why this supports an advertising exception rather than the inclusion of PPIs in drugs
dispensed. See infra notes 182 to 187 and accompanying text.
129See Buckner v. Allergan Pharm. Inc., 400 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 1981),
review denied, 407 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 1981) (where the court rejected the notion that standards
of informed consent may render the learned intermediary rule unavailable, noting that \since
physicians do not have an absolute duty to inform patients of all possible side eects in
every instance, failure to do so in a particular instance should not give rise to a duty in the
manufacturer.").
34legal obligations should devolve to manufacturers in the form of heightened tort
liability.
Interference in the Patient-Physician Relationship
Another theory attacks DTC advertising from the opposite angle, arguing that
an exception is necessary because the information supplied by DTC advertising
disrupts the doctor-patient relationship as it formerly functioned.130This cri-
tique is rooted in a paternalistic, if not somewhat antiquated, conception of the
optimal doctor-patient relationship where the patient plays a deferential role
in making major medical decisions.131 The weaknesses with respect to this
rationale are facially apparent. It is unclear why a physician's irritation at a
patient's DTC advertisement-inspired questions should factor prominently into
the analysis of whether DTC advertising merits an exception to the learned in-
termediary rule. In fact, there is a strong argument to be made that increasing
patient involvement in health care in the form of inquiry about suitable treat-
ment is a welcome change that should be encouraged rather than quashed by
heightening manufacturer liability for advertising. Further, there is a certain
inconsistency in rooting an exception which would essentially mandate full con-
sumer warnings on a noninterference rationale, as the exception would institute
130See e.g., Hall, supra note 19, at 450 (\the doctor will nd it commensurately harder to
educate patients with preconceived expectations about a treatment gained from direct-to-
consumer advertisements").
131Note that the evils of paternalism have also been used to denounce the continued exis-
tence of the learned intermediary doctrine. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 127, at 958. While
these critiques quite rightly note that it is paternalistic to presume a layperson incapable of
digesting warnings, it is arguably paternalistic only in the sense that it shifts full responsibil-
ity to learned intermediaries to comprehend the warnings. The rule does not bar or seek to
discourage laypersons from seeking out warning information on their own and thus is a much
less attenuated form of paternalism.
35only a dierent type interference in terms of heightened patient anxiety and po-
tential distrust of physicians who failed to mention all of the contraindications
individually.
Even assuming that limiting the participation of patients in healthcare de-
cisions was a worthy goal, it is not clear that curbing DTC advertisements
through heightened manufacturer liability would tackle the problem of increas-
ingly informed patients. Those arguing for a DTC advertising exception on an
interference rationale conveniently ignore that it is one of but several inuences
that \interferes" with a physician/patient relationship. It is not clear that the
physician-patient relationship has ever been completely walled o from out-
side interference but this notion is increasingly contradicted by the widespread
availability of information on prescription drugs.
Several information sources independent of DTC advertising may play a
prominent role in an individual's decision to initiate conversation about a par-
ticular prescription drug with a physician. There are numerous written informa-
tion sources available to patients, including counseling sheets often distributed
with drugs purchased at a pharmacy, the Physician's Desk Reference, and many
websites. These may be supplemented by more informal sources, such as the
rave reviews of well-intentioned family members, friends, or other third parties
currently beneting from a prescription drug.132
132See Julie Zito, CDER Direct-to-Consumer Promotion Public Hearing, October 18, 1995.
36Limiting the information to which consumers have access so as to avoid bur-
densome questioning for physicians does not appear to be a feasible option in this
day and age, and an advertising exception will not ultimately halt the ow of in-
formation. The AMA has conceded this reality in abandoning its long-standing,
unconditional opposition to DTC advertising133with the explicit caveat that
the promotional material have educational value.134Moreover, an environment
in which patients are more knowledgeable does not dictate that physicians will
be demoted to a less active role in the decisionmaking process,135so the nonin-
terference rationale does not really strike at the underpinnings of the learned
intermediary rule.
Managed Care Rationale
Managed care is another rationale that features prominently in proposals for
a DTC advertising exception. Proponents of an advertising exception assume
133See Wendy Borow, CDER Direct-to-Consumer Promotion Public Hearing, October 19,
1995 (noting that when the AMA announced its new qualied support of DTC advertising, it
stated that \this method of conveying health care information can serve as an excellent com-
munication vehicle for alerting consumer to new therapeutic treatment modalities, encouraging
people to seek medical advice for conditions that might otherwise go untreated, and enhancing
the patient-physician relationship by increasing patient responsibility for healthy lifestyle and
thus fostering increased dialogue between physician and patient.")
134See Hall, supra note 19, at n.4 (noting that in lifting its opposition to DTC advertising,
the AMA provided two caveats: an advertisement must have \educational value" and drug
manufacturers engaging in a DTC campaign must provide \physician education materials").
135See Noah, supra note 30, at 171 (\ethical and legal duties dictate that the physician retain
an active role in the prescribing process, and consumer participation does not weaken those
duties"). See also Catharine A. Paytash, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Patient
Package Inserts: A Balanced Approach to Preventing Drug-Related Injury, 51 Stan. L. Rev.
1343, 1363 (\The fact that patients are more active in their health care decision does not
render a physician inadequate. Indeed, informed and involved patients may only cause the
physician to ponder prescription drug and therapy choices at greater length. In no way does
this undermine the doctor's knowledge or capability to assess drug treatment programs.").
37that the potential adverse eects of such advertising on consumers will be mag-
nied in a managed care setting for several reasons. They note the doctors face
increased pressure to reduce the length of patient visits. Similarly, they observe
that patients are less likely to establish long-term relationships with the physi-
cian of their choice and more likely to suer disruption in continuity of care due
to the constraints managed care imposes.136They question whether physicians
who are inundated with drug literature and struggle to maintain abreast of
changes in medical knowledge will be able to stay informed of all of the hazards
of drugs they prescribe.137From this they conclude that great familiarity with
a patient's medical history will not serve as a protection against doctors capit-
ulating to patient demand for an advertised drug. Although they are unable to
marshal any empirical evidence to support these contentions, which the FDA
has repeatedly pointed out,138these critics still argue that the manner in which
medical services are provided furnishes a basis for an advertising exception to
the learned intermediary defense.
136The Perez majority employed this tactic in creating an advertising exception.
137See Casey, supra note127, at 957 (\Challenged by a constant bombardment of drug litera-
ture from manufacturers, the physician frequently is unable to keep up with the daily changes
in the state of medical knowledge. The sheer volume of drug literature argues against the
physician being informed of all the hazards of all the drugs and devices he or she prescribes.")
The chain of logic underlying this assertion is extremely weak, however. An age of informa-
tion overload does not prove that the patient is better situated than a medical professional to
evaluate the appropriateness of a prescription drug.
138CDER Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements Commentary, August 1999 (\FDA
is unaware of any data supporting the assertion that the public health or animal health is being
harmed, or is likely to be harmed, by the Agency's actions in facilitating consumer-directed
broadcast advertising. FDA has repeatedly requested empirical data that would document
the hypothesized eects - negative and positive - of DTC promotion on several factors related
to public health. Despite years of print advertising, no rigorous evidence has been presented
to demonstrate that DTC advertising has had any of the hypothesized ill eects.").
38A shift from a fee-for-service regime to managed care does not necessarily
militate for an advertising exception, though. Physicians have an ethical and
legal duty to prescribe medications that are not harmful to their patients, and
the duty is not conditional on the length of the relationship or the method by
which they are reimbursed.139Further, the assertion that physicians are over-
whelmed with information to point of being unable to render proper judgment
unless informed patients assist in analyzation140does not argue so much for an
advertising exception than for an abandonment of prescription classication if
its basis has been so thoroughly eviscerated by managed care.
Describing changes attendant to managed care does not equivocally support
the advertising exception, moreover, as these changes can be just as easily mar-
shaled to support and entrench DTC prescription drug advertising as a positive
countervailing force. The rapid expansion of managed care may arguably sup-
port the use of such advertising for its informational properties. Advertisements
that enable a patient to more accurately and specically describe symptoms and
to ask more pertinent, directed questions may serve an invaluable function in
shorter, more impersonal patient visits.141Further, DTC advertising may func-
139See Paytash, supra note 135, at 1363 (noting that changes imposed by managed care do
not imply \that a doctor who is not personally selected by a patient, who lacks a long-term
professional relationship with that patient, and who bases his or her medical opinion solely
on a health history, a physical examination, and a discussion with the patient cannot make
an individualized medical judgment and prescribe an appropriate drug therapy regimen...It
does not follow that because a more personalized doctor/patient relationship is preferable and
ideal, that the lack of such a relationship renders medical decisions inadequate.")
140See id. at 1364.
141See Andrew S. Krulwich, CDER Direct-to-Consumer Promotion Public Hearing, Oct. 18,
1995.
39tion as the only method of alerting patients to the existence of drug therapies
not currently covered under a plan's formulary.142In addition to educating plan
enrollees, it may empower them to bargain for the addition of the drug to the
restricted formulary and eventually create a groundswell protest that forces the
plan to expand covered drug brands.143It may also provide a patient with the
knowledge needed to negotiate with a physician who operates in a system where
the managed care organization has tied compensation to the prescription drug
fund of that physician's patients and that refunds any money left in the fund
at the year's end.144Additionally, DTC promotion may provide a countervailing
pressure to managed care organizations seeking to cut corners by helping to
instill brand loyalty in end-users and thus assisting these end-users in fending
o physicians' attempts to substitute generic versions even where the drug is
on the formulary.145Arguably, the provision of medical care in a managed care
market where consumers are more informed by DTC prescription drug advertis-
ing secures a role for DTC advertising as a useful component of the present-day
142See Terzian, supra note 96, at 158 (\Studies show that DTC advertising generates an
increased patient load and often causes physicians to spend more time reviewing the benets
and risks of a specic brand with each patient and explaining formulary restrictions when
patients request a brand that is outside the health plan's drug formulary.").
143See "Direct to Consumer Ads: FDA Rules Create Ad Bonanza," American Health Line,
August 10, 1998 (\Some consumer advocates are wary of HMOs and physicians who declare
their opposition to DTC ads...[because] `managed care companies wind up with nefarious deals
with drug companies who lowball bids...(and) doctors don't complain about drug compan[ies]
wining and dining them."').
144See Eugene Schonfeld, CDER Direct-to-Consumer Promotion Public Hearing, Oct. 18,
1995. Note that this stands in opposition to the Perez majority's assertion that managed care
physicians seek to appease patients by providing inappropriate prescriptions because they
cannot aord to lose patients.
145See Noah, supra note 30, at 150. See also \Direct to Consumer Ads: FDA Rules Create
Ad Bonanza," American Health Line, August 10, 1998 (\For HMO and other managed care
companies, DTC ads create an additional demand for pricey pharmaceuticals.").
40system rather than warranting an advertising exception.
Unheralded Benets of DTC Advertising
Those prone to speculate on the magnitude of harm inicted by DTC
advertising of prescription drugs and the necessity of an advertising exception
often fail to mention signicant societal benets that may accrue from such
advertising. DTC advertising is a valuable tool precisely because it educates
consumers146and disseminates information to a segment of people unreached by
third-party education eorts and other public relation eorts. DTC advertising
may also raise public awareness of stigmatized conditions and help to inu-
ence public perception for the better.147 In particular, DTC advertising of
prescription drugs may equip individual consumers with information that may
help them take greater responsibility for their health care, particularly those
not under the regular care of a physician.148For instance, it may convince them
to seek out medical advice for symptoms they had not previously associated
with serious medical conditions149or for medical conditions for which they were
146Drug advertisements do not a substitute for medical advice and may be an incom-
plete sources of information, but this does not defeat the basic notion that they perform
an information-providing function.
147This is true, for instance, with respect to the DTC advertising campaigns for depression
and impotence drugs. See Marcinko, supra note 83 (citing a psychologist's positive reaction to
DTC advertising because \anything that decreases the stigma of mental illness and increases
the number of people who get help is worth it").
148See Karen Hanson, \Prescription Drugs Now Marketed Directly to Consumers," Copley
News Service, March 20, 2000 (observing that many DTC ads target people who do not
usually seek medical care, such as those struggling with weight loss, u, or smoking cessation
and motivate them to schedule a doctor appointment).
149See \Awareness of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Ads Stalls," Research Alert,
October 1, 1999 (noting that 24.7 million of 176.7 million viewers of DTC advertisements
talked with physicians for the rst time about allergies, heart disease, or diabetes as a direct
result of these ads).
41previously unaware that there was treatment.150This is particularly true with
respect to newly available treatments because advertising may be an individ-
ual's rst exposure to such treatments.151It may also inform patients who were
forced to discontinue a drug with intolerable side-eects of new treatment al-
ternatives that lack those side eects.152 Even individuals under the regular
care of a physician stand to benet from the information provided by DTC
prescription drug advertising. Such information may empower individuals to
ask about symptoms a physician's questioning failed to bring to light and to
describe symptoms with great specicity. It may also position a patient to ben-
et from the latest drug therapy where there is a lag in practice. For instance,
it may prompt patients who currently take prescription drugs to inquire about
a newer drug with less severe side eects and ensure that the switch occur
more rapidly.153In serving a reminder function, DTC advertisements may also
encourage patients under the care of a physician to comply with drug therapy
and regular physician visits.154 Substantial cost savings may result from DTC
150See Terzian, supra note 96, at 166 (\Consumers with a chronic illness such as migraine
headaches may not be aware of new drugs available to alleviate their pain; DTC drug advertise-
ments can lead these people back to their doctors for relief."). See also Mary J. Sheet, CDER
Direct-to-Consumer Promotion Public Hearing, Oct. 18, 1995 (noting that with respect to
the drugs Proscar or Hytrin, the condition being treated develops gradually, an individual
may not be aware that the problem is coming and getting worse).
151See Hanson, supra note 148 (commenting that this is particularly true with respect to
treatments for asthma, hypertension, diabetes, or inuenza).
152See Michael C. Allen, Medicine Goes Madison Avenue: An Evaluation of the Eect of
the Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising on the Learned Intermediary Doctrine,
20 Campbell L. Rev. 113, 128 (1997).
153See Noah, supra note 30, at 150, citing to Yumiko Ono, \Drug Makers Try to Win Over
Seldane Users," Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1997, at B1 (commenting that this is likely to be most
pronounced in advertising dogghts where competitors seeking to lure customers away from
existing prescriptions).
154See id. at 152.
42prescription drug advertising. Where DTC advertising facilitates early recogni-
tion and intervention in medical conditions, it stands to improve public health
and potentially reduce the costs of treating diseases.155In the long run, DTC
advertising of prescription drugs may also be expected to promote competition
and encourage consumers to price shop, leading to an overall decline in the price
of the drug.156As manufacturers develop mass markets and are able to spread
xed costs of product development over a larger base of consumers and develop
economies of scale in manufacturing, a downward trend in prices is likely to
result.157Thus, manufacturers' quest to increase name recognition and trigger
patient-physician dialogue through DTC advertising stands poised to provide
some public benets.
Is Carving Out an Additional Exception the Appropriate Response to DTC Advertising?
In light of the magnitude of current DTC advertising expenditures for
prescription drugs, the FDA's eorts to curb advertising excesses, and the po-
tential costs and benets that may redound from such advertising, what is the
proper course of action? More specically, ought consumer expectations in-
formed by DTC advertising alter existing manufacturer liability in terms of
155See Terzian, supra note 96, at 156.
156See Alison Masson & Paul Rubin, \Matching Prescription Drugs & Consumers: The
Benet of Direct Advertising," 313 New Eng. J. Med. 513, 514 (1985) (\A number of
empirical studies in other markets conrm that price decreases do sometimes occur when
advertising is introduced into a market."); Eric P. Cohen, \Direct-to-the Public Advertisement
of Prescription Drugs," 318 New Eng. J. Med. 373, 375 (1988) (citing an empirical study that
found that states permitted advertising were found to have lower prescription drug prices).
157See Schonfeld, supra note 144. However, others dispute this point and argue that when
increased promotional costs are factored into the price, drug prices will perversely increase
rather than decrease.
43recognizing an advertising exception to the learned intermediary rule? Carving
out such an exception in response to DTC advertising that fails to provide com-
plete warnings would to be an asymmetrical & ill-advised response for several
reasons.
The wisdom of eliminating the learned intermediary rule in this context is
suspect. The theory that complete information about a particular prescrip-
tion drug's side eects and contraindications may be eectively and adequately
communicated because a manufacturer has engaged in DTC advertising is un-
proven,158as average consumers lack the requisite educational background to
comprehend information. This assertion largely ignores the tradeo that exists
between clear, understandable (and hence meaningful) warnings and complete,
legally adequate warnings for individuals without a medical background. Thus,
requiring manufacturers to reduce complex warnings to a format understandable
and legally adequate by individuals with no medical or scientic background is
quite possibly a duty manufacturers are incapable of satisfying.159 The
notion that consumers can serve eectively as ultimate arbiters of prescrip-
tion drug information if supplied with more complete information is also highly
doubtful and unproven. Prescription drugs dier from other products adver-
tised to the public in several critical aspects. By denition, they are considered
inappropriate for consumer self-diagnosis and self-medication. This is based
158Simply because a manufacturer has a large advertising budget and is able to communicate
major warnings in a meaningful manner does not automatically mean that it may do the same
respect to more complete (and complex) warnings. This is a dierence that is largely ignored
by those arguing that the act of advertising means that manufacturers are capable of conveying
adequate warnings to consumers.
159See Marvinney, supra note 44, at 73.
44largely on the understanding that prescription drugs hold the potential for ad-
verse eects that may not be easily conveyed due to medical complexity beyond
an ordinary individual's comprehension.160Moreover, drug manufacturers lack
the information necessary to tailor warnings to the specic heightened risks of a
particular patient and therefore the ability to assist individual patients in deter-
mining the appropriateness of a prescription drug.161Reshuing responsibility
from the physician, who is the most strategically situated to prevent consumer
injury, to the manufacturer will not guarantee consumer protection. Detailed,
technical layperson warnings will do little to protect those consumers who are
adamant about obtaining the drug in particular.162 Expanding tort liability
by removing the learned intermediary rule where a manufacturer has engaged in
DTC advertising is not cost-free, moreover, and is likely to produce unintended
results. Open-ended tort liability based on DTC advertising of a prescription
drug may invite the results of the vaccine exception: compromised public health,
individuals unprotected until they are injured and compensated ex poste, and
a dramatic increase in the costs (and ultimately aordability) of drugs to oset
the costs of increased liability.163Recognition of an advertising exception would
16021 U.S.C. section 353(b)(1)(B) (stating that a drug must be dispensed by a physician
when \its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful eect, or the method of its use, or the
collateral measures necessary to its use, is not safe for use except under the supervision of a
[licensed practitioner]").
161See Maskin et al, supra note 9. See also \Prescription Drug Advertising Direct to the
Consumer," 88 Pediatrics 174, 175 (1991) (observing that proper judgment about a drug's
suitability requires consideration of the patient's diagnosis, medical history, prior medications,
adverse and allergic drug reactions, chemical dependency).
162In particular, it will fail to protect the \doctor shoppers" and patients of internet physi-
cians who disregard the reasoned judgment of medical professionals refusing to grant a pre-
scription.
163See Terzian, supra note 96, at 163 (noting that pharmaceutical companies may increase
45subject manufacturers to a virtual land-mine of uncertainty, because current
prescription drug warnings aimed at physicians would be unlikely to meet the
legal standard of adequacy for a reasonable consumer.164This standard would
be exacting if not impossible for manufacturers to satisfy.165Further, it would
be one juries might often conclude was not met considering that many courts
have created a rebuttable presumption of causal linkage in such cases.166An ad-
vertising exception would remove any predictability for manufacturers seeking
to draft adequate warnings, as the common law is incapable of formulating tests
that would enable manufacturers to reliably ascertain the adequacy of warnings
in advance.167Submitting the issues of whether a warning was complete and un-
derstandable to a jury that may be swayed by unscrupulous \expert" witnesses
would further magnify uncertainty and ratchet up potential liability for manu-
facturers.168Ultimately, manufacturers might respond to such expanded expo-
their prices to oset the costs of increased liability if the learned intermediary doctrine is set
aside").
164MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (1985) is a prime example of this. In
this case, the court noted that a \jury may have concluded...that the absence of a reference to
`stroke' in the [PPI] warning...failed to make the nature of the risk reasonably comprehensible
to the average consumer," even though the risk of someone suering a stroke at the plainti's
age was 1.5 in 100,000.
165See Flanagan, supra note 35, at 420 (observing that a what is reasonably comprehensible
to the average consumer is an impractical and nebulous standard, dependent on variable jury
determinations, and perhaps one that no warning would satisfy).
166See Schwartz, supra note 38, at 847.
167See Walsh, supra note 44, at 874.
168See Marvinney, supra note 44, at 74. See also Noah, supra note 30 174-175 (\If courts
recognized an advertising exception to the learned intermediary rule, then pharmaceutical
manufacturers would have to nd a way of disseminating patient package inserts, ensure that
these inserts contained references to all possible side eects in nontechnical language, and
in the unlikely event that they managed to design such an unassailable warning, hope that
a jury would not decide that continued advertising to consumers diluted the eectiveness of
that warning.").
46sure to liability by conveying less rather than more information to consumers
in terms of curtailing their advertising campaigns169 The solution proered
by the Perez court in terms of the use of compliance with FDA regulations as a
rebuttable presumption does not entirely avoid these pitfalls. The presumption
is not ironclad, so it would not reduce uncertainty for manufacturers altogether.
Moreover, the use of FDA regulations to determine whether warnings to con-
sumers were adequate is problematic because the regulations were not designed
with that warning function in mind. As one commentator notes, \the FDA has
not yet revised its advertising rules to require disclosures tailored to patients,
and even if it does, the FDA has not designed its disclosure requirements to
fulll a warning function (in contrast to PPIs for oral contraceptives) so much
as to ensure that promotional claims do not lack fair balance. Judicial review,
in particular by juries, of whether the brief summaries appended to print adver-
tisements adequately discharge any new-found duty to warn patients directly is
bound to conclude that the warnings were inadequate for a purpose the FDA
never had in mind."170 An advertising exception based on the hobbled inter-
mediary theory would also leave unanswered the question of why the prescribing
physician, who plays an indispensable function and who has not been demoted
from the position of exercising ultimate judgment, may abdicate responsibility
for determining a drug's appropriateness and conveying risk information appli-
cable to the individual patient.171Further, it leaves unanswered why a physician
169See Noah, supra note 30, at 169.
170See id. at 176.
171The question remains unanswered as well in the literature urging the adoption of an
47whose negligent prescription was not at an overbearing patient's behest should
be sheltered by an advertising exception.172The more compelling premise of the
widely recognized exception for mass immunizations { an absent-learned inter-
mediary { is absent in the case of prescription drugs, which by denition cannot
be safely used by consumers absent the diagnosis and supervision of a physician.
DTC advertising does not alter the role of physician as the ultimate gatekeeper
because patients eager to try an advertised prescription drug cannot lawfully
obtain the drug minus the assent of a physician. Shifting responsibility from
the physician to the manufacturer simply because the manufacturer promoted
a prescription drug directly to consumers makes little strategic sense if the chief
concern is protecting patients ex ante, and it will not guard against the possi-
bility that a patient may ingest a therapeutically inappropriate drug. Lowering
the threshold of the standard of care to which a physician must adhere, in terms
of engaging in a rigorous assessment of the appropriateness of a drug and per-
forming a full clinical evaluation, will do little to protect individuals from harm.
The claim that overpromotion may undermine a physician's ability to exercise
advertising exception where an end-user's \reasonable reliance" on advertisements, whether
or not viewed by the end-user, is supposed to wipe out any responsibility of the physician to
make a prudent determination of the appropriateness of the drug. See, e.g. William B. Hirsch
and Fabrice N. Vincent, 18 No. 1 Prod. Liab. L. & Strategy 4 (1999) (\drug manufacturers
should be prepared to compensate those who suer injuries as a result of reasonable reliance
on drug advertisements that fail to adequately warn of product risks and drug alternatives").
172See, e.g. Noah, supra note 30, at 172 (\the advertising exception seemingly would elimi-
nate the learned intermediary rule even in cases where the plainti had not seen or relied on
any promotional claims for a particular drug and exerted any pressure on the physician.") But
see Tyler and Cooper, supra note 118, at 1103 for an attempt at a solution to this problem,
where they propose that loss be apportioned to manufacturers according to their contribu-
tion to risk. The case-by-case administration of such a rule would still leave the problem of
unsettled expectations. See infra notes 163-169 and surrounding text for a discussion of this
problem.
48appropriate judgment in the prescribing decision is compelling in the context
of manufacturer promotion schemes directed at physicians but not where the
advertisements are directed at consumers. Courts have quite appropriately rec-
ognized that overpromotion or false assurances to the learned intermediary may
dilute the eectiveness of warnings and render them inadequate, insofar as such
marketing may cause the ultimate arbiter of the prescribing decision to down-
play dangers associated with the drug.173The notion that overpromotion may
disable the learned intermediary and distort his of her reasoned judgment has
much less bite in the DTC advertising context, however. While DTC advertise-
ment may increase patient demand for a prescription drug, it ultimately does not
(a) impact the medical decision of whether to prescribe in light of an individual
patient's medical history174or (b) undermine a physician's ability to understand
prescription drug warnings. Because courts, regulatory authorities and profes-
sional associations so closely monitor the manner in which prescription drugs
173Courts have responded by holding that over-promotion to medical professionals
may nullify marginally adequate warnings provided by the manufacturer. See, e.g.
Stephens v. Parke-Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (1973); Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1964) (where the court held that the duty to warn end-users shifted to the manufac-
turer, because the manufacturer had \watered down its regulations-required warnings and had
caused its detail men to promote a wider use of the drug by physicians than proper medical
practice justied").
174This is particularly true where patients circumvent their regular physicians and shop for
a physician willing to prescribe a certain medication, either through oce visits or on the
internet. Recognizing an advertising exception will only reward and shelter such reckless
physicians, particularly physicians willing to prescribe a drug over the internet without ever
having physically examined the patient. An advertising exception covering such circumstances
is not likely to decrease injuries resulting from the use of inappropriate medication, as manu-
facturer provided warnings would be unlikely to deter consumers who are willing to obtain the
drug at all costs even if it requires physician shopping. See Jay B. Spievack, Direct Ads May
Create Liability Dangers, Nat'l L. J., March 15, 1999 n. 21 (\The fact that the patient and
health care provider have freely decided to forgo a physical examination should not somehow
make a pharmaceutical manufacturer responsible for their careless act or omission.").
49are promoted to physicians to ensure lack of bias and accuracy,175physicians
remain well equipped to act as learned intermediaries and to respond appropri-
ately to patient pressure even in an age of DTC prescription drug advertising.176
A more closely tailored and eective response to concerns of DTC advertising-
inspired patient pressure for a prescription is a physician notication and educa-
tional campaign conducted by the manufacturer.177This would alert physicians
to a DTC campaign which might increase the frequency of which a certain drug
would appear in physician-patient dialogue. Further, it would provide a re-
fresher course for physicians of the side eects and contraindications making
prescription unwise, ultimately sharpening the learned intermediary's ability to
exercise reasoned judgment with respect to the advertised drug.178Such an ed-
ucational campaign would be responsive to the concern that a physician battles
an unknown source of information that has fueled the patient's request179and
would prepare a physician to educate patients with preconceived expectations
about an advertised drug about why that course of treatment may be inap-
propriate. This preventative approach would be far superior to an advertising
exception, insofar as the review provided to learned intermediaries would render
injury less likely. An advertising exception, in contrast, is less likely to reduce
175See Noah, supra note 30, at 160.
176See Allen, supra note 152, at 127.
177See Wendy Borow, CDER Direct-to-Consumer Promotion Public Hearing, Oct. 18, 1995.
178See id.
179See Hall, supra note 19, at 450 (arguing that DTC advertising \undermines the traditional
legal rules governing transmission of information to patients" in part because \the doctor must
deal with an unknown source of information").
50injuries up front; its chief virtue would be to ensure easier recovery for an indi-
vidual in a tort claim after injury has resulted.
Informed consent critiques of DTC advertising are also more appropriately ad-
dressed by measures other than a DTC advertising exception. If the chief con-
cern is that physician warnings of potential side eects may fall on deaf ears in
light of positive imagery provided by DTC advertising,180it is more eectively
addressed by patient package inserts (PPIs) than by altering tort liability stan-
dards. PPIs would serve as an informational supplement in disclosing particular
warnings that may be useful for patients to counterbalance against promotional
claims. They would also serve as an easy-to-understand, written memorializa-
tion of the physician's verbal instructions to which end-users may refer back
to periodically.181The PPI summary, abbreviated for clarity and intelligibility's
sake, would not supply endusers however with full information necessary to
make the prescribing determination because it would contain warnings of only
the most serious side eects. It would preserve the learned intermediary's role
in working with informed patients to prevent end-user injury, as it would not
excuse physicians from exercising sound medical judgment.182 Provision of
180See Hirsch and Vincent, supra note 171 (\As prescription drug manufacturers market their
drugs directly to consumers, the physician's actual ability to deter consumption by eectively
communicating product warnings is likely to be eroded."). See also Jerey A. Cohen and
Janet A. Sullivan, 17 No. 3 Prod. Liab. L. & Strategy 1 (1998) (\One could argue, however,
that even assuming that the warnings given to the `learned intermediary' were adequate at
the time of sale, the risks conveyed to the patient by the physician, or perceived and weighed
by the patient, were diluted by direct advertisements to the consuming public.").
181See Paytash, supra note 135, at 1361 (\Verbal warning given by doctors to patients who
may be in pain or ill are easily forgotten. Written warnings, in contrast, can be reread and
referred to at a later time.").
182See id. at 1369.
51PPIs would not undermine the basis of the learned intermediary rule but rather
complement it. In the case of oral contraceptives, where the FDA has long
required PPIs, the requirement was implemented with the express intent that
it would not relieve physicians from determining whether a drug is appropriate
for a particular individual.183The overwhelming number of courts petitioned to
recognize an exception to the learned intermediary rule based on the provision
of PPIs have ratied this understanding, as they have declined to opportunity
to do so.184Courts have instead used such occasions to arm that the learned
intermediary rule is fully applicable where prescription drugs contain PPIs.185
Conclusion
Perez was an unfortunate opinion because it was poorly informed by case
18343 Fed. Reg. 4214, 4214-4215 (1978) (contraceptive PPIs instituted were not intended to
\aect adversely the standard of civil tort liability which is imposed on drug manufacturers
and dispensers" but rather \serv[e] primarily as an informational adjunct to the physician-
patient encounter and is intended to reinforce and augment oral information given by the
physician to the patient at the time the drug is prescribed").
184See, e.g., Martin v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ill. 1996) (\A
majority of courts considering the question have held that the FDA regulations concerning
contraceptive pharmaceuticals should not serve as a basis to displace or create exceptions
to the learned intermediary doctrine...By refusing to abrogate State common law in light
of a Federal regulation, these courts have recognized the important policy considerations
underlying the learned intermediary doctrine. The doctrine rests on the assumption that pre-
scribing physicians, and not pharmaceutical manufacturers, are in the best position to pro-
vide direct warnings to patients concerning the dangers associated with prescription drugs.");
McPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 424-25 (D.D.C. 1991) (rejecting plainti's
contention that \a duty to provide direct and adequate warnings to users of the pill is implicit
in the Food and Drug Administrations package insert regulations"). But see supra note 49
for rare instances where courts have departed from this approach.
185See, e.g., Zanzuri v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748 F. Supp. 1511, 1516 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (stating
that it is \not persuaded" that FDA regulations should redene the scope of the cause of action
under state tort law); Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024 (D. N.J. 1988) (where
the court, in commenting on FDA regulations requiring manufacturers to supply brochures
with an IUD, noted that \Patient brochures provided by the manufacturer to physicians for
distribution to the consumer may aid the physician in communicating with his patient but
do not establish the undertaking by the drug manufacturer of a voluntary duty to warn the
patient directly. Moreover, to the extent that [such regulations require patient warnings]...it
undercuts if not abrogates the learned intermediary rule and should be narrowly construed.").
52precedent and was a fundamentally misguided attempt to protect end-users of
prescription drugs from injury. The majority reached a wrong conclusion be-
cause it failed to evaluate DTC prescription drug advertising in the context of
traditional rationales of the learned intermediary rule. Had the majority not
resorted to willful mischaracterization of the rule's premises, it may not have
concluded that the consumer rather than the physician is the actor best situated
to receive warnings, make individualized determinations, and prevent end-user
injury.
An unvarnished view of DTC prescription drug advertising, which takes into
account its informational benets as well as its potential to mislead consumers,
does not furnish automatic support for an advertising exception to the learned
intermediary rule. Rather, it supports a system where the FDA remains vigi-
lant in taking swift action against those who violate current guidelines. It also
supports a system where the FDA is poised to counteract abuses of DTC adver-
tising that arise, such as substantive critiques of downplayed risk information,
by ne-tuning its guidance.
Rationales advanced for abandoning the learned intermediary rule in the context
of DTC prescription drug advertising fail to persuade that the rule has outlived
its usefulness. Managed care and noninterference with the physician-patient
relationship arguments are internally weak and a DTC advertising exception
will not solve the problems detailed by these rationales. The argument that
DTC advertising may hobble the learned intermediary by increasing the load of
prescription drug requests that a physician must evaluate is more compelling,
53although it does not warrant the extreme solution of an advertising exception.
Physicians are not the targets of DTC promotional eorts, so the theory that
overpromotion will distort physician judgment and render them unable to refuse
inappropriate prescription drug requests remains unsupported. Moreover, the
fear that physicians may relax prescribing guidelines in response to an onslaught
of requests is more appropriately remedied by physician prenotication of an im-
pending DTC prescription drug advertisement campaign and refresher materials
of the complete side eects and contraindications supplied to learned interme-
diaries. Similarly, informed consent critiques are more eectively addressed by
PPIs than by a shift in tort liability from physician to manufacturer. Provision
of PPIs would supply interested consumers with detailed information about a
drug's side eects but would continue to hold physicians responsible for exer-
cising responsible judgment in the prescribing context.
Ultimately, the premises of the learned intermediary rule remain valid in the con-
text of DTC prescription drug advertising and do not warrant a departure from
the rule. Because medical professionals most fully understand side eect warn-
ings and serve as the only party capable of exercising reasoned medical judgment
with respect to individualized risks, they remain the party most strategically
situated to evaluate information even in an age of DTC prescription drug ad-
vertising. The learned intermediary doctrine serves an indispensable function
in protecting consumers and is one not capable of being supplanted by an alter-
native that insulates patients as well from injury. Shifting responsibility from
the prescribing physician, who ultimately authorizes receipt of the drug, to the
54manufacturer who theoretically may not be capable of providing meaningful and
complete warnings to laypersons, would be a poor, if not ineective, method of
ensuring that inappropriate and potentially harmful prescription drugs are not
administered to endusers.
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